The previous post priced a business as a static object: multiple × EBITDA, minus net debt. The actual private-equity trade is dynamic — buy with borrowed money, run the system forward for five years, sell — and the right mental model for someone with a math background is not a spreadsheet but a small discrete dynamical system: one state variable that grows, one that amortizes, and an observation function you only get to evaluate twice.
The state and the two equations you control
Write for EBITDA in year , for the EV/EBITDA multiple, for net debt and for the equity — the part that is yours. The whole deal is two evaluations, one at entry and one at exit:
Everything in between is the evolution of and . In the toy model (and to first order, in real deals):
where is EBITDA growth, the interest rate, and the cash conversion — the share of EBITDA that survives taxes, capex and working capital and is free to repay debt. The debt line is the part newcomers underestimate: it is a recurrence in which the business's own cash flow amortizes the acquisition debt. The company buys itself, slowly, on your behalf.
Returns are then two numbers, and with a single entry and exit cash flow they carry the same information:
The first is the money multiple; the second is the same number, annualized.
That exponent is worth staring at: a 2.0× over four years is a 19% IRR; the same 2.0× over seven years is 10%. Time is not a detail — it is in the exponent. This is why "when to sell" is a real decision, and why the third post in this series hands exactly that decision to a reinforcement learner.
The value-creation bridge, derived
Where did the equity gain come from? Expand the difference:
Read the terms left to right: the same multiple on a bigger business; the market re-rating that business; the sweep having worked. Check the algebra: the three terms telescope exactly to the equity delta — no residual, no hand-waving. This decomposition is the value-creation bridge, and it is how every exited deal gets explained to investors. The three terms also have very different reputations: growth is earned, multiple expansion is weather (you can position for it; you cannot manufacture it), and deleveraging is arithmetic that works as long as nothing breaks.
One more identity worth internalizing — why leverage amplifies. With , the same enterprise gain is divided by a smaller equity base as . At and , a 25% rise in EV doubles your equity. The mirror image is equally exact: a 25% fall in a 6×-levered deal wipes it to two turns of cushion. Leverage has no opinion about direction.
Drag it
The model below is the engine from this post running live — the same code the worked numbers above come from. Suggested experiments:
- Set growth to 0 and both multiples equal: the IRR that remains is pure deleveraging. This is the "boring base case" every lender underwrites.
- Push leverage from 2× to 6× at fixed growth: watch IRR climb while the margin for error (exit equity vs entry equity under a multiple drop) shrinks.
- Buy at 8×, sell at 6×: see how much growth it takes just to stand still. Multiple contraction is the quiet killer of vintage returns.
- Stretch the hold from 4 to 7 years with everything fixed: same MoM mechanics, melting IRR.
What the toy ignores — knowingly
One debt tranche at one rate (real deals stack senior, mezzanine, sometimes PIK); cash conversion as a constant (real working capital breathes with growth); no taxes on exit, no fees, no management incentive plan; and a multiple you choose rather than a market you meet. None of these change the structure — they decorate the same three-term bridge.
The bigger omission is uncertainty. Here, and are sliders; in reality they are stochastic processes, and the one genuine decision you keep holding is when to stop the process and sell. Making that precise — EBITDA as a random walk with drift, the multiple mean-reverting through cycles, and an agent learning the exit policy from ten thousand simulated deals — is the next post.